One of the key innovations in SESAR and NEXTGEN is the introduction of a strategic Trajectory Based Operation (TBO) layer. This paper studies rare emergent behaviour of a ground-based future concept that makes use of both a strategic TBO layer and a tactical resolution layer. The results are compared to those of an advanced airborne self-separation model, for which preceding studies have identified remarkably effective collaboration of the TBO layer and the tactical layer. The current study describes the development of the ground-based version of this earlier model, and the systematic evaluation of this groundbased version through rare event Monte Carlo simulation. The simulation results obtained reveal key challenges that remain to be resolved in order for a ground-based future concept to accommodate very high traffic demands as well as the advanced airborne self-separation model does.
I. Introduction
NE of the key innovations in NEXTGEN and SESAR is the introduction of a Trajectory Based Operation (TBO) layer complementary to a tactical resolution layer. The objective of this TBO layer is that aircraft accept and subsequently realize conflict-free four-dimensional (4D) trajectory plans. In contrast with this, in conventional ATM, medium term planning is provided by the planning controller, flight crews and their Flight Management Systems (FMS), whereas the tactical loop is formed by the tactical controller and flight crews. Thanks to decades of evolutionary developments the collaboration between these two layers has been optimized. Hence a similar optimization of the novel TBO layer with the tactical layer is needed. Because the collaboration between these layers involves dynamic interactions between human decision makers, technical support systems, aircraft evolution, weather and other uncertainties, the combined effects result in types of emergent behaviours that cannot be predicted from the sum of the elemental behaviours.
Through a series of agent-based safety risk analysis studies [1] - [4] , it was shown that an advanced airborne selfseparation concept of operations (ConOps) can safely accommodate very large en route traffic demands. In particular it was shown that the combination of an airborne-based strategic TBO layer and an airborne-based tactical layer had an unexpectedly positive effect on safely accommodating high traffic demands. The positive findings for advanced airborne self-separation triggered the research question whether such effective collaboration between TBO layer and tactical layer is also feasible for a ground-based TBO ConOps. This research question is addressed within the EMERGIA project [5] . The aim of this paper is to present the intermediate EMERGIA results [6] .
The specific airborne self-separation ConOps considered in [1] - [4] is the Advanced Autonomous Aircraft (A3) design of [7] - [8] . This A3 design is largely based on an advanced free flight design of NASA [9] , which was later published in a conference paper [10] , and has been evaluated through pilot-in-the-loop simulations [11] . The A3 design has a four layered architecture:
-Strategic flow control layer -Trajectory Based Operation (TBO) layer -Tactical conflict resolution layer -Collision avoidance layer
The two layers in the middle of these four differ a lot from current ATM. In the TBO layer, each aircraft determines a 4D trajectory plan that is aimed to be conflict-free from the 4D trajectory plans of other aircraft. This 4D trajectory plan is broadcast to all other aircraft. As long as there are conflicts between 4D broadcast trajectory plans, the aircraft involved will be triggered to iterate until the overall situation is conflict-free. The tactical conflict resolution layer aims to resolve any short term conflicts through tactical course changes. This is needed if, for example, an aircraft deviates too much from its 4D trajectory plan, or if the iteration to conflict-free 4D trajectory plans has not been completed in time.
The research question that is addressed in this paper is the following. If one transfers the various sub-systems of the two middle layers of the A3 ConOps to the ground, and one also enters the tactical and planning controllers in the loop of these two layers, does the resulting ground-based TBO ConOps provide the same positive findings as those obtained for the A3 ConOps? The theoretical expectation is that this should be possible, because the conflict resolution algorithms stay the same, and so do the pilots and aircraft that have to assess and fly the trajectories. The only change is that the tactical and planning controllers are now placed within the control loop. In order to test this theoretical expectation, a ground based version (A3G) of the A3 ConOps has been developed, as well as an agentbased A3G model and Monte Carlo (MC) simulation software. Subsequently, rare event MC simulations have been conducted with this agent-based A3G model, for two-aircraft and eight-aircraft encounter scenarios. This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the ground-based version of the A3 ConOps, as well as the resulting A3G simulation model. Section III compares rare event Monte Carlo simulation results of a twoaircraft head-on encounter under the A3G model with those obtained under the A3 model. Section IV does the same for eight-aircraft encounters. Section V draws conclusions and presents the follow-up research.
II. Ground-based version of A3 ConOps

A. From A3 ConOps to A3G ConOps
The A3 ConOps [7] addresses the hypothetical situation of 100% well-equipped aircraft. For this A3 ConOps an Operational Services and Environmental Description (OSED) is also available [8] . The A3 ConOps adopts TBO in the sense that each aircraft maintains a 4D trajectory intent that is shared with all other aircraft. According to SESAR terminology [12] , the 4D trajectory intent of an aircraft is referred to as a Reference Business Trajectory (RBT). However, RBT management in the A3 ConOps is done by each aircraft itself, without any support from air traffic control at the ground. Each aircraft is assumed to be equipped with the same dedicated Airborne Separation Assistance System (ASAS) system which is monitoring the surroundings and helps the flight crew to detect and resolve conflicts. Similar as in [9] , A3 uses two layers in the detection and resolution of potential conflicts: the TBO layer and the tactical resolution layer. The TBO layer takes care of making updates of the RBT in case of a medium term conflict. The ASAS support of the TBO layer consists of a Medium Term Conflict Detection and Resolution (MTCDR) support system. The tactical layer takes care of resolving short term conflicts. The ASAS support of the Tactical layer consists of a Short Term Conflict Detection and Resolution (STCDR) support system. Whereas under the A3 ConOps the responsibility for managing separation was completely moved to the air, under the A3G ConOps this responsibility is moved back to Air Traffic Control (ATC). Hence under A3G the 4D trajectory plans and tactical resolutions are provided by ground-based ATC. Because the MTCDR and STCDR support systems have proven to work so well for A3, the proposal is to reuse these MTCDR and STCDR support systems for A3G, with one major difference: now they are going to be used as support systems for ATC rather than for flight crews. In addition to this, in the A3G ConOps the ATC system will maintain a database containing all currently active RBTs. Hence, within A3G, for each aircraft, MTCDR supports the controller in identifying 4D trajectories which are conflict-free (i.e. centre lines stay 5 Nautical miles (Nm) or 1000 ft apart) with the currently active RBTs of higher priority aircraft over a time horizon of at least 15 minutes. Each time MTCDR detects a medium term conflict between any of the currently active RBTs in the ATC system database, MTCDR tries to resolve this through determining a new conflict-free 4D trajectory for the aircraft having lower priority. The priority of an aircraft is primarily determined by the remaining distance to destination. Conflict-free also means that the 4D trajectory does not create a new conflict with an RBT of any of the other aircraft that have higher priorities. Upon acceptance of such new 4D trajectory plan by the controller, it is uplinked to the appropriate aircraft and evaluated by the flight crew. Upon acceptance by the flight crew this 4D trajectory plan is entered into the Flight Management System (FMS) and downlinked to the ATC system as the aircraft's new RBT. In the ATC system this downlinked RBT is then stored in the database of currently active RBTs.
Similarly, within A3G STCDR provides tactical maneuver support to a tactical air traffic controller for conflict resolution with a time horizon of 3 minutes, at a separation criterion of 5Nm/1000ft. When STCDR detects a potential infringement of these separation criteria, it proposes candidate tactical resolution maneuvers to the controller for each of the aircraft involved. The controller selects one of these tactical resolution maneuvers and subsequently instructs the corresponding flight crew to implement this maneuver. This tactical maneuver instruction is then also inserted in the ATC database as a correction to the corresponding RBT.
B. RBT updating and MTCDR in the A3G ConOps
Similar as in the A3 ConOps, in the A3G ConOps an RBT prescribes multiple waypoints which can be inserted by the pilot in the FMS, directing the aircraft to its end goal.
In Figure 1 the new procedure for RBT updating in the A3G ConOps is presented. In this procedure the groundbased ATC system and the Planning air traffic controller (ATCo-P) are incorporated. The procedure is initiated on the ground by the ATC system. The MTCDR support system of ATC detects a medium term conflict and will then try to generate a new conflict-free trajectory, based on the available intent information of all aircraft. This conflict-free trajectory is proposed as candidate RBT update to the planning Air Traffic Controller (ATCo-P). The ATCo-P will check if the proposal is accepted or not. If the ATCo-P accepts the proposal, then it is submitted to the corresponding aircraft through the ATC Uplink Transmitter. The Pilot Flying will check the given RBT update and when accepted will insert this in the FMS, and the aircraft will follow this updated RBT. Finally the aircraft will broadcast the updated RBT from its FMS to the ATC ground system using Automatic Dependent Surveillance -Broadcast or Contract (ADS-B or ADS-C). Upon reception this received RBT is used to update the RBT data in the ATC ground system. The above described procedure for RBT updating may also be used to let the FMS guide an aircraft back to its initial path after a tactical resolution manoeuvre. In such case the RBT updating consists of a conflict-free 4D trajectory that brings the aircraft back to its goal.
In the MTCDR support system used within the A3 ConOps, the selected conflict resolution approach was based on Velocity Obstacles [13, 14] . Velocity Obstacles (also known as Collision Cones) based conflict resolution means that an aircraft stays away from the set of courses and velocities that lead to a predicted conflict with any other aircraft. In airborne self-separation research, such Velocity Obstacles approach has been referred to as Predictive ASAS [15] . At this moment the Velocity Obstacle approach is limited to horizontal maneuvering only. Complementary to the choice of Velocity Obstacle based conflict resolution, the following implementation principles have been adopted for the MTCDR support system: + MTCDR detects planning conflicts (5Nm/1000ft) 10 min. ahead and subsequently determines a 4D trajectory plan that is conflict free over a horizon of 15 min.
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+ Aircraft nearest to destination are given priority over other aircraft. + An aircraft with lowest priority is assumed to make its 4D plan free of conflict (15 min ahead) with all other plans.
+ If there is no feasible conflict free plan then rather than doing nothing, it is better for the MTCDR to identify a plan that has a minimal undershooting of the 5Nm/1000ft criterion and does not create a short term conflict.
+ Upon approval by the controller, a non-conflict-free 4D trajectory plan is uplinked to the aircraft together with a "Handicap" message. For the flight crew this handicap message means that the priority of its aircraft has been increased, and that the controller will resolve the remaining conflicts with the help of those aircraft having now a lower priority. Upon acceptance by the flight crew, the 4D plan is entered into the FMS, and it is downlinked as the new RBT to ATC, again together with the Handicap message. This new RBT is stored in the ATC database together with the Handicap message.
Using the above principles, for each aircraft the MTCDR computes an RBT advisory by determining a sequence of Trajectory Change Points (TCPs) with minimum turning angle (to the left or to the right) such that there are no predicted conflicts remaining with any aircraft that has higher priority and that is within the MTCDR horizon. If no such turning angle is possible below a certain value (e.g. 60 degrees), a turning angle that provides the lowest undershooting of the minimum spacing criteria of 5Nm/1000ft between the RBTs is identified. In that case ATC assumes the corresponding aircraft to be handicapped. As soon as the advised MTCDR advisories have been accepted by the controller and the pilot, they are implemented in the FMS and downlinked to ATC. 
C. Tactical resolution and STCDR in the A3G ConOps
If a short term conflict is detected its resolution through RBT updating would take too much time. Hence a faster tactical resolution process is necessary. Just as in the A3 ConOps a tactical resolution is based on aircraft states and if available also on intent information. A tactical resolution consists of an immediate heading change or a height change. In Figure 2 the tactical resolution process as used in the A3G ConOps is presented.
The tactical resolution process starts with the detection of a short term conflict by the STCDR support system of ATC. This STCDR will then automatically determine a possible tactical resolution in terms of a heading or height change. Because the time horizon is short, this tactical resolution is open loop, i.e. it does not include a back-to-goal maneuver. The proposed tactical resolution is shown to the Tactical Air Traffic Controller (ATCo-T). The ATCo-T verifies the proposed resolution, and may reject or accept it. If accepted it is sent to the corresponding aircraft through the ATC uplink transmitter. Subsequently, if a short term conflict has been resolved through an action by aircraft i, then a back-to-goal mechanism generates a back-to-goal intent for aircraft i, which is verified by the ATCo and then uplinked to aircraft i.
Upon receiving the tactiucal resolution message, the Pilot flying will implement the tactical resolution by switching the aircraft from FMS to manual (tactical Auto Pilot / Flight Director) mode and subsequently implementing the given heading or height change. Subsequently ADS-B broadcasts the slowly changing heading or height to the ATC ground system.
Simultaneously with sending the tactical resolution through the ATC uplink transmitter, the ATCo-T inserts the instructed heading or height change in the ATC ground system. A side-effect of this is that the actual behaviour of the aircraft will happen with some delay relative to the information in the ATC ground system. This allows the ATC system to anticipate the proposed heading change, because it is already aware of the oncoming heading or height change of the aircraft. By directly updating the intent information before the aircraft actually has changed its heading, the detection and resolution of other short term conflicts works more efficiently.
At this moment, the specific implementation principles adopted for the STCDR support system are directed to horizontal maneuvers only:
+ STCDR detects conflicts (5Nm/1000ft) 3 min. ahead and subsequently determines a course change into a direction that is conflict free over a horizon of 4 min, i.e. 1 min beyond the conflict detection horizon.
+ Short term conflict resolution is also based on Velocity Obstacles approach. + When a short term conflict is detected between two aircraft, the agent-based STCDR identifies two conflictfree tactical maneuver options: one for each aircraft. It is up to the controller to select one of the proposed tactical maneuver options, to instruct this maneuver to the applicable flight crew, and to enter this as an RBT modification in the ATC database.
+ If there is no feasible alternative, then rather than doing nothing it is better to choose a tactical maneuver which minimizes the undershooting of the minimum tactical separation criterion.
+ Upon acceptance by the crew, the aircraft downlinks its new course, which allows the ATC system to verify that the instruction has been implemented well.
Using the above principles, STCDR proposes a resolution course as the minimum turning angle (to the left or to the right) such that there are no predicted conflicts remaining with any aircraft within the short term horizon. If no such turning angle is possible below a certain value (e.g. 60 degrees) a turning angle that provides the lowest undershooting of the minimum separation criteria is identified.
D. Agent-based A3G simulation model
The A3G ConOps has been developed into an agent-based simulation model, which has subsequently been implemented in Delphi XE3, i.e. the same language as used for the A3 model implementation. It should be noted that this model is an initial one which does not (yet) incorporate Weather, Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) or Airline Operations Centre (AOC). Moreover, in developing this A3G model the following model assumptions have been adopted: A1. In the A3G model all aircraft are identical and fly at the same altitude with the same speed.
A2. In the A3G model no emergency situations are modelled.
A3. In the A3G model no Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) data is assumed to be available to ATC.
A4.
In the A3G model the 4D plan in the ATC system is considered to be unreliable if ADS-B message about the RBT in the FMS is not received.
A5.
In the A3G model no ground based navigation support is available, i.e. navigation is based on Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) and Inertial Reference System (IRS) only.
A6. In the A3G model the dependability (e.g. reliability, availability) of the ground system is similar to the dependability of ASAS in the A3 model.
A7.
The mean duration of the global uplink frequency being down (i.e. unavailable) is 1 hour.
The consequences of these A3G model assumptions shall be taken into account later on when arguing about the simulation results obtained for the A3G model.
The agent-based A3G simulation model code has been developed by modifying the A3 model code in six steps. After each of these steps, dedicated verification tests have been conducted to compare the novel results with those obtained by the ASAS model in each of the aircraft.
Step 1: Create an initial shadow ATC system An initial shadow ATC system is created in the form of an auxiliary aircraft agent for i = 0. Hence this initial shadow ATC system receives the ADS-B broadcasts from all aircraft i = 1,..,N, and uses these to maintain states and intents of all these aircraft. All functionality that is not needed for receiving ADS-B broadcasts and for maintaining all these states and intents is deleted from this initial shadow ATC system.
Step 2: Insert Conflict Detection and Resolution in the shadow ATC system.
The Conflict Detection and Resolution (CDR) part of aircraft agents i = 1,..,N is copied into the shadow ATC system. Hence in this shadow ATC system the CDR part is separately modelled for each aircraft. Moreover, each CDR uses the state & intent information from all aircraft to detect conflicts and generate a conflict resolutions for aircraft-i.
Step 3: Add ATC uplink transmitter An ATC uplink transmitter is added to the shadow ATC system, in order to send generated resolution advisories to the corresponding aircraft.
Step 4: Add an Air Traffic Controller (ATCo)
Tactical and Planning Air Traffic Controller agents are inserted between the CDRs and the ATC uplink transmitter. In Figure 3 an overview of the model after step 4 is shown. Step 5: Aircraft crew uses resolution advisories from ground system In this step 5 the crew receives the resolution advisories from the ground instead of from their own ASAS. Due to this step 5, each aircraft will fly according to the resolution advisories generated by the ground system.
Step 6: Delete airborne ASAS Finally, for each aircraft the airborne ASAS support system is deleted.
III. Monte Carlo simulations of two-aircraft encounters
This section investigates under which model parameter values the A3G model produces rare event Monte Carlo (MC) simulation results for two-aircraft encounters that are as good as those obtained for the A3 model. The twoaircraft head-on encounter scenario is the same as the one used for the Monte Carlo simulation results of the A3 model [1, 2] . Figure 4 shows a curve that has been obtained in [1] for the two aircraft encounter scenario under the A3 model and A3 baseline parameter values. The curve shows the measured probability that there is a moment in time at which the horizontal distance between the aircraft trajectories is smaller or equal to various miss distance values between 6 Nm and 2 Nm,. Through conducting series of MC simulation runs we have identified A3G selected parameter values that allow the A3G model to produce almost the same curve as the one of the A3 model in Figure 4 . There appear to be eight specific parameters that require values that differ from comparable A3 baseline values. These eight parameters and their A3G selected values (green column) are shown in Table 1 , together with the A3 baseline parameter values. 
A. A3G selected parameter values
B. Discussion of A3G selected parameter values
This subsection discusses the A3G selected parameter values obtained for the two-aircraft encounter scenarios. Also the influence of the A3G model assumptions A1-A7 is considered.
P1. Airborne GNSS receiver not working (failure)
The effect of an airborne GNSS receiver failure in the A3G model is different from the effect in the A3 model. In the A3 model a GNSS receiver not working doesn't have a large effect on the results, because the own aircraft still resolves all the conflicts. However in the A3G model this is not the case anymore. The position error of an aircraft increases if the GNNS receiver is not working; in the ATC ground system this difference between the real position of aircraft-i and the 4D RBT-i information results in an RBT that is not consistent. The ATC ground system then drops the intent information of aircraft-i. When only the state information of aircraft-i can be used, this results in a short term conflict.
The Monte Carlo simulation results showed that in the A3G model an unavailability probability of , which is a factor 50 less stringent. One should be aware that in the A3G ConOps ground-based navigation support will be available. This overrules A3G model assumption A5, and implies that for the A3G ConOps there likely is no problem in realizing a 50 times more stringent navigation availability requirement.
P2. ADS-B transmitter not working (failure)
The large effect on the results of the ADS-B transmitter is different in the A3G model with respect to the A3 model. In the A3 model the situation was as follows. If the airborne ADS-B transmitter of aircraft-i fails then other aircraft-k are unable to receive state and intent information of aircraft-i. Without state and intent information aircraft-k cannot safely resolve the conflict and thus does nothing. But in the A3 model aircraft-i still receives state and intent information of aircraft-k and thus aircraft-i can resolve the conflict.
In the A3G model separation is controlled from the ground. If the ADS-B transmitter of aircraft-i fails, the ATC ground system doesn't receive the state and intent information of aircraft-i. Hence no resolution with aircraft-k is possible. Outdated state and intent information is dropped by the ATC ground system after predetermined times. The ATC ground system is then unaware of the state and intent of aircraft-i, and both the medium term layer and the tactical layer are unable to generate a resolution for aircraft-i or aircraft-k.
The MC simulations results showed that an unavailability probability of , which is much less stringent. One should be aware that in the A3G ConOps assumption A4 does not hold true, i.e. an RBT in the ATC system will not so rapidly be considered to be unreliable when ADS-B transmitter is down. This means that for the A3G ConOps it is not required that the ADS-B transmitter satisfies such very high availability requirement.
P3. ATC Ground System not working (failing or corrupted)
If the ATC ground system is down or corrupted both the Medium Term TBO layer and the Short Term layer are not working. This means no conflicts are detected or resolved, and aircraft will continue flying their possibly conflicting RBTs.
In the A3 model the probability of ASAS failure is . Due to assumption A6 a similar failure probability value has been adopted for the ATC ground system failure. The outcome shows that in the A3G model the failure probability of the ATC ground systems should be at a value of 10 
10
  , which is a much more stringent requirement. Because similarly stringent requirements already apply to current ATC ground system in busy airspace, this means that assumption A6 is unrealistic and should be dropped.
P4. ADS-B Ground receiver not working (failure)
In the A3G model the ADS-B ground receiver is used by the ATC ground system to receive the state and intent information of all aircraft. If the ADS-B ground receiver is not working no new information is received. In the A3 model if the ADS-B ground receiver of aircraft-i is down the other aircraft are still capable of resolving the conflicts with the available state and intent information. In the A3G model if the ADS-B ground receiver is down it is down for all aircraft. Hence no intent or state information is received. The ATC ground system is then unable to resolve conflicts, due to outdated information.
The Monte Carlo simulation results showed that the unavailability probability of the ADS-B ground receiver needs to be 10 1 10   . One should be aware that in spite of assumption A3 for the A3G model, in the A3G ConOps SSR Mode-S radars will be fully in use, which avoids this very stringent availability requirement for the ADS-B ground receiver.
P5. Global ATC uplink frequency occupied
The global ATC uplink frequency is used in the A3G model to send the resolution advisories from the ATC ground system to the aircraft. If this frequency is occupied then no resolution is sent. The aircraft will continue to fly according to their current conflicted flight plans.
The MC simulation results showed that a unavailability probability of 8 
10
  appeared necessary to obtain similar results as for the A3 model. However, this stringent availability requirement applies for a mean duration of the global uplink frequency being down of 1 hr (assumption A7). At factors 10 or 100 lower mean durations, the availability requirement may be less stringent by the same factors. This brings the Global ATC uplink requirements at a practically manageable level.
P6. ATCo-Tactical maximum response time
In the A3G model a conflict detection and resolution advisory is proposed by the ATC ground system. The resolution advisory is then first checked by the ATCo before it is sent to the corresponding aircraft using the ATC Uplink transmitter.
For the A3G model the MC simulation results have shown that the ATCo-T response should not take longer than 2 seconds in order to get A3 model simulation results. Obviously, such 2 seconds response time requirement is not realistic at all. Moreover, none of the A1-A7 assumptions has influence on this.
However, the good news is that the MC simulation results also have shown that the A3G deviation from the A3 results only slowly increases when the ATCo-T response increases from 2 seconds to 10 seconds.
P7. ATCo-Planning maximum response time
In the A3G model, variations in the ATCo Planning maximum response time appeared to have a negligible effect on the curve in Figure 4 . Hence for the two-aircraft encounter scenario considered the selected A3G parameter value for the ATCo-P response time is fine.
P8. ATC Uplink transmitter sending duration
The ATC Uplink transmitter is used to send resolution advisories generated by the ATC ground system to the aircraft. For the A3G model to get A3 model simulation results it appears necessary that the uplink transmission does not take longer than 1 second, which is much shorter than the 12 s duration of ADS-B broadcasting an FMS intent by an aircraft in the A3 model. None of the A1-A7 assumptions influences this.
In the next subsection an analysis is provided why this ATC uplink transmitter sending duration is more stringent than the ATCo-Tactical response time value of P6.
C. ATC uplink transmitter sending duration
In Figure 5 the Monte Carlo simulation results for two-aircraft encounters are presented in which the uplinking of a novel flight plan takes 12 s. The curve in Figure 5 differs significantly from the desired A3 model curve in Figure 4 . In order to better understand the difference between the results obtained for the A3 model and for the A3G model we compare the control loop delay effects under both models. Under the A3 model the delay is largely caused by the decision-making delay of the flight crew. Under the A3G model there are extra delays due to the decisionmaking by one of the ATCo's and by the ATC uplink transmitter. The probability density function of the pilot decision-making delay is presented at the top of Figure 6 in the form of a Rayleigh shaped density with mean value of 5.6 s. Under the A3G model the pilot decision-making delay still applies in addition to the delays by the ATCo and the ATC uplink transmitter. At the bottom of Figure 6 , this is represented by the same Rayleigh density as the one at the top of Figure 6 , though now shifted 12 s to the right for the extra delays by ATCo and ATC uplink transmitter. This has as consequence that the chance to be too late (e.g. the probability of more than 30 s delay) is many orders of magnitude larger. Although being too late still is a rare event, the effects become visible in the tail of the curve in Figure 5 .
In addition to this rare but significant effect of the larger delay, there is another complementary effect. Under A3, the flight crew can synchronize the tactical decision-making with the implementation of this decision. This gives the flight crew the possibility to anticipate better on the actual situation. Under A3G, the flight crew no longer has this tactical decision-making power, because this is now done by the ATCo-T. Although the ATCo-T does this in some optimal way from an ATC perspective, this adds significant delays between the moment of decision-making by the ATCo and the moment of accepting and implementing by the flight crew, and thus reduces the synchronization of tactical decision-making with the implementation of the decision.
Through investigating MC simulated trajectories that ended in the tail of Figure 6 , the specific consequence of being too late has also been investigated. The finding is that in rare occasions only, a 12 s delay of the uplink transmitter leads to a too late implementation of the STCDR in the aircraft. As a result of such extra delay, the next STCDR will be generated by the ATC system. In the current A3G model this next STCDR is passed on by the ATCo, through the uplink transmitter to the pilot. In some specific rare cases this may lead to an alternating series of left/right instructions, yielding the tail in Figure 5 .
The above explains why a delay by the uplink transmitter is far more critical than a delay by the ATCo-T. The choice of the STCDR update is being made by the ATCo-T in a way that is kind of optimal at that very ATCo decision-making moment. That's why some more delay by the ATCo also leads to a more optimal decision. However, due to the delays by the uplink transmitter and by the pilot, an ATCo decision is implemented so much later that it may be far from optimal in some rare cases. For the two-aircraft encounter scenarios this rare but undesired effect could be mitigated by limiting the delay of the uplink transmitter to 1 second. Table 2 presents a summary of the A3G model results for A3G model parameters P1-P8. The third column denotes the effect on the results of the change in the parameter to a (comparable) A3 baseline value. The effects can be none, negligible, significant or large. The last column indicates if the observed effect is due to one of the assumptions A1-A7. ATC uplink transmitter sending duration large -To conclude the described two-aircraft encounter MC simulation results: It is possible to obtain similar results with the A3G model as obtained for the A3 model. However to obtain these results the A3G baseline parameter values that were based on the A3 baseline parameter values needed to be changed to more stringent values (which are referred to as the A3G selected parameter values). When taking into account assumptions A3-A7, two key parameters remain for which unexpectedly stringent requirements apply:
D. Overall finding
P6: ATCo-Tactical maximum response time (2 seconds) P8: ATC Uplink transmitter sending duration (1 second) Specifically, the 2 seconds response time for P6 of the ATCo-Tactical differs a lot from current practice. Also demanding are the requirements on P8, the ATC Uplink sending duration.
IV. Monte Carlo simulations of eight-aircraft encounters
In this Section Monte Carlo simulation results for eight-aircraft encounters under the A3G model are presented and discussed. An illustrative example realization of such eight-aircraft encounter is given in Figure 7 . The red parts of the curve indicate when the aircraft is controlled manually, i.e. it is flying the STCDR-based heading changes. 
A. A3G selected parameter values applied to eight-aircraft encounters
In Figure 8 Monte Carlo simulation results are presented for the eight-aircraft encounter using the A3G selected parameter values. The curve shows the probability that there is a moment in time at which the horizontal distance between the trajectory of one aircraft and the trajectories of the other aircraft is smaller of equal than miss distance values between 6 Nm and 0 Nm.
The results of the A3G model under A3G selected parameter values in Figure 8 are very different from the MC simulation results of the A3 model under A3 baseline parameter values [1, 2] . The first part of the curve is the same, though beyond a probability level of 2 
10
 the curve is completely different.
Because of these large differences identified, some realized MC simulation results in the tail of the curve in Figure 8 have been analyzed on what happens. This showed that the cause of the problem lies in the tail of the delay by the pilot in implementing an updated MTCDR or STCDR. In the A3 ConOps such rare lengthy delay by a pilot may also happen, but there this has a completely different impact. In the A3 model the choice for a new MTCDR or STCDR is made by the pilot on the basis of the actual traffic situation, and then it is immediately implemented in the FMS or through the mode control panel. However, in the A3G model the choice of the MTCDR or STCDR update is being made by the controller, also in a way that is an optimal decision at that very moment. However from that moment on it takes some time until such MTCDR or STCDR is being implemented by the pilot. This means that situations occur in which the optimal ATC decision is no longer optimal at the moment of implementation by the pilot. 
B. Need to improve Pilot and ATCo response times
Through conducting series of rare event MC simulations for the eight-aircraft encounter scenario, it has been identified that the A3G model can produce similarly well as the A3 model does (see Figure 9 ), under the condition that even more stringent parameter values than the A3G selected values are adopted for:
P6. ATCo-Tactical maximum response time (1 second) P7. ATCo-Planning maximum response time (1 second) P9. Pilot maximum response time (1 second) Figure 9 shows that, thanks to these further improved parameter values, the A3G model results for the eightaircraft encounter scenario are similar to those for the A3 model using the A3 baseline parameter values.
V. Conclusions
One of the key innovations in NEXTGEN and SESAR is the introduction of a strategic TBO layer [12, 16] . For the first time rare emergent behaviour has been studied for a ground-based future concept that makes use of both a strategic TBO layer and a tactical resolution layer. The development of the Trajectory Based Operations A3G ConOps and model is described. The A3G ConOps and model are derived from the A3 ConOps and model. Inherent to this, the A3G model is a hypothetical model which does not yet include ACAS, for example. For the pure airborne A3 model it was shown in [1] [2] [3] [4] that the combination of a strategic TBO layer and a tactical layer had a significantly positive effect on safely accommodating high traffic demands. The objective of this research was to investigate by rare event Monte Carlo (MC) simulations if the same positive results could be obtained with the A3G model. In the A3G model all separation is controlled by one ground-based Air Traffic Control (ATC) system instead of by each aircraft separately as in the A3 model.
During the development of the A3G ConOps some decisions had to be made regarding the specific procedures to be followed by the tactical and planning controllers. In order to anticipate a large increase of traffic demand, it was decided to use datalink and to replace the current practice of the tactical controller awaiting positive read-back by the pilots by a ground system based verification of FMS downlinked information.
The A3G model was evaluated for two-aircraft head-on and eight-aircraft encounter scenarios. The rare event MC simulations for the two-aircraft encounter scenario showed that the A3G model was capable of delivering the same results as the A3 model. However, this posed high requirements on the settings of the parameter values of the A3G model. In particular, high requirements were found regarding the maximum response times of the tactical ATCo (2 seconds) and of the ATC uplink transmitter (1 second).
The MC simulations for the eight-aircraft encounter scenario showed that in order for the A3G model to behave similar to those of the A3 model, unrealistically high additional requirements have to be posed on the maximum response times of the ATCo-Tactical (1 second), the ATCo-Planning (1 second), and the Pilot (1 second). Under these parameter settings the A3G model was able to perform like the A3 model did for the eight-aircraft scenarios. The key explanation of the need of such short response times is as follows. In the A3 model the choice of conflict resolution maneuvers is made by the pilot on the basis of the actual traffic situation, and then it is immediately implemented in the FMS or through the mode control panel. However, in the A3G model the choice of conflict resolution maneuvers is being made by the controller, also in a way that is an optimal decision at that very moment. However from that moment on it takes some extra time delay until such conflict resolution maneuver is being implemented by the pilot. This means that rare but non-negligible situations occur in which the optimal ATC decision is no longer optimal at the moment of implementation by the pilot. For the eight-aircraft encounter scenarios this rare effect could be avoided by reducing all responses by the pilots, the ATCos and the uplink transmitter to 1 second. These findings lead to the conclusion that the A3G model studied is not able to safely accommodate very high air traffic demand as well as the A3 model can. Rare problems with significant effect that already happen for two-aircraft encounters become more frequent and more severe for eight-aircraft encounters.
Because the above conclusions apply to the A3G model studied, the follow-up question is if the A3G ConOps can be modified in such a way that the key bottlenecks are mitigated. This question will be addressed in follow-up research within the EMERGIA project. The first phase of this follow-up research was to organize brainstorming sessions with ATM concept experts on the identification of potential ways to improve the A3G ConOps [17] . Among the identified improvements are adaptations of the MTCDR and STCDR algorithms, prioritization of ATC uplink messages, and changing the tactical ATCo role to one of exception handling. These adaptations will be implemented in an improved A3G simulation model. Subsequently novel rare event MC simulations will be conducted in order to find a definitive answer to the question posed in the title of this paper.
